INTRODUCTION
The topic of responsibility in environmental risk management has received increasing attention in the past several years. Not only does it matter what measures should be taken, equally important is the question who should take any measures. The focus of the present study is on the allocation of responsibilities for addressing environmental risks in transboundary water governance. Inadequate management of water may lead to famines, food insecurity, ecological destruction, and conflicts over scarce resources such as freshwater and arable land (Gleick 2007) . With more than 260 river basins shared by 2 or more countries and 39 countries receiving most of their water from outside their borders (UNDP 2006) , transboundary water basins may provide a source of (regional) instability or even conflict, especially when downstream users cannot meet their water needs because of upstream pollution or the presence of large dams (Zeitoun 2009) .
It is increasingly recognized that effective environmental management in transboundary situations requires coordinated and cooperative action among diverse individuals and organizations, ranging from those responsible for implementing regulations to those responsible for reducing their water consumption or pollution. Currently, little insight exists on how to foster collective action in transboundary situations such that individuals and organizations take responsibility to address environmental risks.
Unfortunately, the discussion of responsibility is dispersed over at least 3 diverse and separate bodies of literature, with little discussion on how responsibilities are actually distributed in real-life situations of transboundary environmental management. In the environmental philosophy literature, the focus is often on the extent to which individuals can be held responsible for environmental risks, most often in relation to climate change (Van de Poel et al. 2012; Peeters et al. 2015) . In the environmental management literature, attempts have been made to develop approaches that allocate responsibility for pollution among producers and consumers (Lenzen et al. 2007; Berzosa et al. 2013) . A 3rd body of literature is the economics literature on collective action and-most oftenthe lack thereof as a result of free-rider behavior (see the following section). Although the economics literature pays ample attention to transboundary cooperation, this is often done by way of formal games rather than a qualitative analysis of real-life situations. Hence although these bodies of literature all provide interesting ideas about responsibility, none of them provide a complete empirically informed picture for transboundary situations in which countries or governmental agencies have to initiate action.
In the present study, I assess the extent to which the insights developed in the different bodies of literature are compatible with and provide insight to real-life transboundary cooperation. I do so on the basis of 4 brief case studies in transboundary water management. I introduce the management of environmental risk, such as risks related to climate change, pollution, and resource exploitation, as a collective action problem-that is, a situation in which the efforts of 2 or more individuals or individual organizations are needed to achieve a desired outcome, but in which it is in the individual's or organization's rational self interest not to take any action. Then I present 12 principles for allocating responsibilities in environmental management, followed by a discussion of 4 case studies to show how these principles can be used to analyze the success or lack thereof. The present study's focus is on the application of the 12 principles; a more systematic discussion of the principles is beyond the scope of the present study. Finally, I argue that allocation of responsibilities should be seen as a risk distribution problem, which should fulfill the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness. In situations in which the existing organizations do not allow for an efficient, effective, and fair allocation of responsibilities, states have a "metaresponsibility" to set up a more appropriate constitution of organizations that does allow for a proper allocation of responsibilities in transboundary risk governance.
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM
Environmental management poses many challenging situations in which collective action is needed, ranging from the prevention of overuse of our natural resources to reduction of pollution. These situations are prone to free-rider behavior, where it is in the collective interest that an individual or organization takes action or cooperates, but in their selfinterest not to take any action. This free-rider behavior not only takes place at the level of individuals, but also at the level of organizations including states and countries. The challenge is, therefore, to find means by which individuals and organizations are encouraged to engage in cooperative behavior.
In the context of environmental management, international conventions and agreements are needed by which governments commit themselves to addressing transboundary environmental issues, as was done in the recent Paris climate agreement concluded at the United Nations Conference on Climate Change (COP21). So long as governments do not commit themselves to such agreements, few, if any, environmental concerns will be effectively addressed (Sandler 2004) . Mostert (2015) identified 12 normative principles for distributing responsibilities in the context of environmental management (Table 1) . Some of these principles clearly have an ethical connotation. The principle of solidarity (principle 9), for example, reflects the idea that it is unfair to allow any one individual or organization to carry all of the burdens and risks. In the philosophy literature, responsibility distributions are deemed fair only if the named individuals or organizations have the capacity to fulfill the assigned responsibilities (principle 1; Doorn 2012). In the context of environmental management, it is generally considered fair to allocate responsibility to those individuals or organizations that causally contributed to the problem (principle 3; Van de Poel et al. 2012 ). Disco and Van Heezik (2015) compare 4 international river basins of which the Netherlands is a part: the Rhine, the Meuse, the Scheldt, and the Ems (Figure 1 ). They present the general post-1945 history of river basin management as a 3-phase transition from the river as use-object to the river as Table 1 . Principles for allocating responsibility
PRINCIPLES FOR ALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITIES

CASE STUDY: COLLECTIVE ACTION IN 4 TRANSNATIONAL RIVER BASINS
Capacity
Responsibility for specific tasks should be given to those who possess or can develop the resources needed to perform these tasks well.
Lowest social costs
Total costs for society should be minimized.
Causation
Those causing a problem should be (financially) responsible for its solution.
Interest
Those with an interest in a management task should be responsible for this task, provided that they have the capacity and financial means to do so. Vice versa, in the absence of formal obligations, individuals should not be made responsible for tasks in which they do not have an interest.
Scale
The management scale should match, to the extent possible, the scale of the management issues.
6. Subsidiarity Tasks should be performed at the lowest possible level, preferring small scale, decentralized management to centralized management.
7. Structural integration Responsibilities for closely related tasks should be combined.
Separation
Tasks should be allocated to different individuals or organizations if a system of checks and balances is needed, for instance, to prevent specific interests from being overlooked.
Solidarity
The risks and burdens that the members of a group have to face or carry should be shared by the group as a whole.
Transparency
The allocation of responsibilities should be clear.
Stability
The allocation of responsibilities should not change frequently, but should change when needed to adapt to changing circumstances.
12. Acquired rights Acquired rights, not acquired wrongs, should be respected and, if necessary and appropriate, compensation should be offered.
Adapted with permission from Mostert (2015) .
intrinsically valuable. The main concern in river management has shifted from water quality , to the restoration of ecological quality , and finally to efforts to protect against flooding, which centered on improving the retention and storage capacity of rivers. Attempts to restore preindustrial river morphology went hand in hand with increasing concern for the cultural-historical landscape through which the rivers flowed.
The history of international cooperation in the Rhine River basin began in 1950, with the 1st meeting of the International Commission on the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution. Cooperation flourished between 1987 and 2000, when the Rhine Action Plan (RAP) was put into place. The RAP was the immediate response to a fire at the Swiss pharmaceutical firm Sandoz on November 1, 1986. In an attempt to put out the fire, a mixture of contaminated water and chemicals was released into the Rhine. As a result, water intakes were forced to close and downstream wildlife was killed (G€ uttinger and Stumm 1992) . The resulting huge and unprecedented public outcry prompted political action. Only 12 days after the incident, the relevant Rhine ministers convened in Zurich; they met again in December 1986. They acknowledged that the prevailing Chemicals Convention had proved ineffective for maintaining the Rhine's water quality, and that battles over national interests had degraded the river's ecosystem. Headed by the Dutch Minister of Public Works, Neelie Kroes, who was advised by the former Secretary General of the International Commission on the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution, Pieter Huisman, the Rhine ministers told the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution to draft an "action plan" that would restore the river. Kroes aptly adopted the slogan "bring the salmon back into the Rhine," which appealed to the general public and provided a new diplomatic window of opportunity (Disco and Van Heezik 2015, p 74). On January 22, 1988, the governments of the 5 Rhine countries signed the RAP. This document formulated its objectives in terms of the positive goals of ecological and morphological restoration rather than chemical threshold levels; it was left to the discretion of the signing countries how to achieve these goals. Thus, the RAP did not consist of prohibitions and prescriptions, but rather goals to which the signatories had committed themselves, reflecting a spirit of mutual trust (Disco and Van Heezik 2015, p 265) . Although the RAP was ambitious, by the early 1990s most of its goals had already been achieved (Disco and Van Heezik 2015, p 78) .
In the history of European transboundary water policy, the RAP stands out not only as a uniquely effective effort to improve the chemical and ecological quality of the Rhine River, but also as a remarkably fruitful example of initiating collective action. By contrast, cooperation in 3 other transboundary rivers proved difficult. Following the success of the RAP, many policy makers recommended that a similar approach be used for the Meuse and Scheldt rivers (Verweij 1999) . However, whereas the nations bordering on the Rhine already had a history of setting up international committees to fight pollution, neither the Meuse nor the Scheldt nations had such a history. In the absence of any international commissions, the Dutch pursued a negotiation strategy that used the Scheldt primarily as a means of exchange. Their exclusive sovereignty over the downstream part of the Scheldt, which gave them control over the access route to the Flemish port of Antwerp, made them extremely powerful. In return for allowing the Belgians to dredge the Scheldt and thereby gain access to Antwerp, the Dutch would be allowed to set standards for the quality and quantity of water that entered the Netherlands via both rivers. However, by negotiating an agreement at the state level, both the Dutch and the Belgian negotiators overlooked the Belgian region Wallonia and its strivings for greater independence; since the 1970s, Wallonia had been granted freedom to manage its own economic affairs. The agreement more or less imposed water standards on this region, negatively impacting its economy without providing any accompanying benefits.
Moreover, whereas the riparian states on the Rhine all acknowledged the severity of the pollution problem and the urgent need to take action, such consensus was lacking for the Scheldt and the Meuse. The issue of pollution in the latter 2 rivers was not high on the agenda of the environmental movement, nor did it attract a lot of media coverage. As a result, politicians stood to gain little electoral traction by supporting this cause.
The river Ems also suffered from lack of action. The Ems is fed almost entirely by German agrarian land, with the exception of a small part lying on the eastern flanks of the Dutch provinces Drenthe and Groningen. The river runs through the German states North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony before flowing into the Ems-Dollard basin at the German international seaport Emden. The Ems-Dollard estuary connects the Ems with the Wadden Area, a region that is safeguarded by nature protection schemes. Because this estuary is a transboundary body of water between Germany and the Netherlands, all decisions that affect it must be agreed upon by these 2 nations under the Ems-Dollard Treaty. As with the Scheldt, the Ems also suffered from a conflict between navigational use of the estuary and a concern for ecological quality. In the late 1960s, the Dutch began to build a new port at Ems harbor, with much shorter and deeper access to the sea than the German seaport of Emden; the German central and regional governments, fearing competition, developed a plan to modernize the Port of Emden. This plan included the construction of a large industrial complex near the Dollard.
This plan caused much uproar both among environmentalists and in the Dutch parliament, as it would inevitably undermine the ecological quality of the estuary. However, because the existing treaty on the Ems-Dollard did not include any environmental provisions, the only way to block or change the plan was to negotiate a more inclusive treaty that would limit the environmental pressure caused by economic use of the estuary. This proved difficult. As it turned out, the main cause for delays and lack of action was not so much the conflicting use of the transboundary estuary itself but rather Germany's fragmented governance arrangements. Whereas responsibility for navigational affairs was allocated to the central state, responsibility for environmental concerns was allocated to the federate state ("Bundesland") of Lower Saxony. As a result, few restrictions were placed on navigational use because it was difficult for the lower-level agency of Lower Saxony to impose such restrictions on the higher-level Ministry of Transport (Disco and Van Heezik 2015, p 233) . In contrast, the Netherlands was represented by the same national agency, Rijkswaterstaat, in the commissions on both navigational use and environmental concerns. For the German representatives, it was hard to understand that the same institution could represent both of these interests. Such institutional incompatibilities led to mutual distrust and a lack of initiative to improve the water quality of the Ems-Dollard estuary.
DISCUSSION
The cooperation, or lack thereof, in the 4 different river basins reflects principles identified in Table 1 . Principle 1 (capacity) is probably the most fundamental principle for allocating responsibilities, both in the philosophical literature and in the governance literature. Individuals and organizations can be made responsible for a task only if they have all the means and resources available to perform that task. In terms of technical resources, the Rhine stands in sharp contrast with the other rivers. Whereas the Rhine was already equipped with an excellent monitoring system for water quality, detailed knowledge of the scale of pollution was not available for the other river basins; resources were lacking.
In all 4 cases, closely related and complementary principles 5 and 6 (scale and subsidiarity) are highly relevant. The management scale needs to fit, to the extent possible, the scale of the issue to be managed (Young 2003) . The subsidiarity principle, originally espoused by de Tocqueville (1835), states that responsibilities should be allocated at the lowest level possible (Kraemer 1998 ). In the case of the Rhine, the responsible ministers agreed upon the problem but delegated the responsibility for taking measures to the respective countries. In contrast, in both the Meuse and the Scheldt river basins, quality standards were set by the Dutch and imposed on the Belgians. Thus, the Walloon region became responsible for reducing their pollution without having any autonomy in deciding how to do this and without any benefits from doing this. Also, in the Ems river basin, there was a mismatch between the management scale and the problem at hand. The lowerlevel governmental agency of Lower Saxony was powerless when it came to imposing measures to reduce environmental impact, because navigation, and economic concerns more generally, were the responsibility of the central government. With that, principle 7, stating that responsibilities for closely related tasks should be allocated to as few individuals or organizations as possible, was also violated.
Principles 11 (stability) and 12 (acquired rights) were also violated. Both principles emphasize the need for gradual rather than radical change. In the case of the Rhine, there was an existing basis for cooperation and the RAP was the adaptation of an existing scheme of responsibilities, not a completely new allocation of responsibilities. In contrast, the inclusion of environmental concerns in the management of the EmsDollard estuary was a clear break with the past. Similarly, the mandated inclusion of environmental standards in the Scheldt was a sharp contrast with the acquired right of the Walloon region to manage their own affairs.
Principle 9 (solidarity), a general level of trust, came into play in the Rhine, but not the other 3 river basins. In the case of the Rhine, Dutch minister Kroes sowed the seeds for fruitful cooperation by refusing to blame other countries for systematic pollution; instead, she complemented her Swiss colleague for the effort that Switzerland had already put into pollution prevention (Disco and Van Heezik 2015, p 268) . This created an atmosphere of trust, which was clearly lacking in the other river basins where distrust was the rule not the exception.
CONCLUSIONS
The earlier discussion clearly shows that the allocation of responsibility is more than an issue of efficiency, it is also an issue of effectiveness and fairness. The principles set out in Table 1 , together with the 4 case studies, show that responsibility should be seen as a risk distribution problem, with the risk distribution ideally being efficient, effective, and fair (Doorn 2012) . If an agreement is considered not to be fair, it is unlikely that it will be effective (Sandler 2004) . Trust is also critically important, particularly when cultural differences come into play, but this is impossible without fairness.
As shown in the case of the Rhine, collective action problems between nations are not completely intractable. However, they are complex, and success stories are less common than should be the case, particularly given the global issue of climate change and associated problems (environmental degradation such as habitat loss or invasive species, food insecurity, resource-based conflict, etc.). As the case studies illustrate, the 12 principles need to be explicitly considered in discussions regarding allocation of responsibilities and subsequent actions. The comparative analysis showed that in some cases the existing organizations were not set up in a way that would have allowed for an efficient, effective, and fair allocation of responsibilities. In those suggestions, states have a metaresponsibility to set up a more appropriate constitution of organizations that does allow for a proper allocation of responsibilities in transboundary risk governance.
